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The "Triangular Case" in the New
U.S.-Netherlands Tax Treaty:
Mechanisms and Tax Planning
YVES BONNARD*
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 1, 1994, a new income tax treaty between the United
States and the Netherlands entered into force. The protocol amending
the original version of the treaty provides special rules for a specific
type of income: U.S.-source interest and royalties earned by a branch
of a Dutch corporation located in a low-tax third country.2 This situa-
tion is called the triangular case.3
Assume that a multinational corporation ("Dutch Co.") has its
headquarters in the Netherlands and that its financial branch handles
its investments in foreign subsidiaries. The financial branch is a per-
manent establishment4 located in Zug, a low-tax canton (state) in Swit-
zerland. This branch is also responsible for the licensing of patent
rights owned by Dutch Co. to manufacturing divisions. All interest and
royalty income of Dutch Co. is centralized in its financial branch. A
subsidiary of Dutch Co., Ameri Co., is a U.S. corporation that pays
interest and royalties to the Swiss financial branch.
* Associate with Baker & McKenzie in Geneva, admitted in Switzerland; LL.M.
in Taxation, University of Denver, 1994. The author gratefully acknowledges the
review of earlier drafts of this article by John R. Wilson, adjunct Professor of Taxa-
tion at the Graduate Tax Program of the University of Denver College of Law.
1. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of
Fiscal Evasion, Dec. 18, 1992, U.S.-Neth., 32 I.L.M. 457 [hereinafter Convention].
Taxpayers may elect to remain covered by the prior convention for calendar year
1994. Convention, art. 37, para. 2, at 504; I.R.S. Notice 94-1, 1994-2 I.R.B. 1.
2. Protocol Amending the Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and
the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion, Oct. 13, 1993, U.S.-Neth., 33 I.L.M. 160 [herein-
after Protocol]. The diplomatic notes for the Protocol were exchanged on December
30, 1993, and it became effective on January 1, 1994. The provisions related to the
interest and royalty articles became effective on January 29, 1994.
3. The term triangular case involves different problems. This study is limited to
the U.S. concerns about tax avoidance in triangular cases as recently developed in
the Protocol to the U.S. - Netherlands Income Tax Treaty. See generally OECD
Commentary on Model Income Tax Treaty, art. 24, notes 51-54; ORGANIZATION FOR
EcONOMIC COOPERATION & DEVELOPMENT, MODEL TAX CONVENTION: FOUR RELATED
STUDIES (Paris 1992)(on file with author); PHILIP BAKER, DOUBLE TAXATION CON-
VENTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL TAX LAw 396 (2d ed. 1994).
4. For a definition of permanent establishment, see OECD Model Income Tax
Treaty, art. 5, reprinted in BAKER, supra note 3, at 140-42 [hereinafter OECD Mod-
el].
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Without any tax treaty or internal law provision, the interest and
royalties paid by Ameri Co. and earned by Dutch Co. could incur tax
liability in three countries: (1) The United States, where the interest
and royalties are paid, could impose its 30% withholding tax;5 (2) The
Netherlands, where Dutch Co. is incorporated, could tax this income as
a part of Dutch Co.'s world-wide taxable income; and (3) Switzerland,
where the interest and royalties are actually earned, could tax the
income of Dutch Co.'s branch as a Swiss permanent establishment.6
As a relief from double taxation, the Netherlands applies the
exemption method.7 Under this method, foreign income is tax free in
the taxpayer's Country of Residence, or home country, whether the
foreign country (the Country of Source8 ) taxes the income or not. Ap-
plying the exemption method, the Netherlands does not tax the income
earned by Dutch Co. in Zug through its Swiss branch.
The Convention reduces the U.S. withholding tax on interest to 5
or 15 percent and eliminates the tax on royalties.9 By definition, a
branch does not constitute a separate entity, so the financial branch of
Dutch Co. can take advantage of the U.S.-Netherlands tax treaty even
though it is located in Switzerland, a third country. Finally, the branch
pays few taxes in Zug, which is a low-tax state.
As a result, instead of incuring taxes in three different countries,
the interest and royalties paid by Ameri Co. to the Swiss branch of
Dutch Co. are actually subject to very little tax: a reduced withholding
tax on interest in the United States and a low income tax in Zug.
In order to prevent such tax avoidance, the Protocol provides for a
flat 15 percent U.S. withholding tax on interest and royalties earned
by a foreign branch of a Dutch corporation from sources within the
U.S. if the aggregate tax rate imposed on such earnings in the Nether-
5. I.R.C. § 881(a)(1) (1994).
6. OECD Model, supra note 4.
7. The United States uses the tax credit method, which consists of subtracting
the tax paid in the Country of Source from the home country tax liability.
8. Under its Decree for the Prevention of Double Taxation, the Netherlands
applies a method called proportional tax exemption. See generally Kees van Raad,
Business Operations in The Netherlands, 150 TAX MGMT. 150-5th (1989) (describing
the proportional tax exemption method). Relief from double taxation occurs when the
taxpayer qualifies for the proportional tax exemption.
In order to qualify for the proportional tax exemption, the foreign in-
come must be subject to an income tax in the country from which the
income is derived .... Furthermore, it is required only that the income
is taxable under the foreign income tax law; not that foreign tax is
imposed and paid. Consequently, if no foreign income tax is paid as a
result of, e.g., loss compensation and tax fraud, this does not affect the
application of the exemption.
Id. at A-47.
9. Convention, supra note 1, art. 12 (for interest), art. 13 (for royalties), at 472-
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lands and in the third country does not equal at least 50 percent (60
percent after January 1, 1998) of the regular Dutch corporation tax
rate."0
The international tax policy of the United States will not allow a
Dutch corporation the benefit of the Convention if the interest and
royalties from U.S. sources are either tax free or subject to low tax
rates. The United States will probably extend this policy to other U.S.
treaty partners that use the exemption method as a relief from double
taxation. In 1992, the House of Representatives discussed, though
never adopted, provisions similar to the Protocol." As shown below,
these provisions would have superseded all existing U.S. treaties
signed with "exemption-tradition" treaty partners. The underlying
cause of this new policy is clear: the United States is concerned that
the execution of a treaty with an "exemption-tradition" country may
create too many tax havens for interest and royalties.
The provisions of the Protocol generate as many problems as they
solve. This article begins by describing the distinction between the ex-
emption and the tax credit methods and the mechanics of the Protocol
itself. The article then addresses the following questions: (1) If the
Country of Residence applies the "exemption with progression" method
in order to avoid double taxation, should the increased tax liability in
this country be taken into account in determining the minimum re-
quired aggregate rate of tax?; (2) What are the repercussions of an
income tax treaty between the U.S. and a third country on the flat 15
percent withholding tax?; (3) Will the U.S. impose this kind of provi-
sion on other treaty countries, such as Switzerland, that also apply the
exemption method as a relief from double taxation?; (4) If so, will this
change occur through treaty negotiations or by enactment of internal
provisions that would override existing treaties?; (5) Do these provi-
sions represent an invasion of the treaty country's internal law beyond
the scope of an income tax treaty?; and finally, (6) What are the conse-
quences for such treaty countries and for their corporations?
II. EXEMPTION: RELIEF FROM DOUBLE TAXATION
A. Relief From Double Taxation
International double taxation typically occurs when the same
person is liable for tax in two different jurisdictions on the same item
of income.12 The Country of Source, also called the host country, taxes
10. Protocol, supra note 2.
11. H.R. 5270, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
12. See generally Yoseph Edrey & Adrienne Jeffrey, Taxation Of International
Activity: Over Relief From Double Taxation Under The U.S. Tax System, 9 INT'L TAX
& Bus. LAW. 101 (1991); JEAN-MARC RIVIER, INTRODUCTION. A LA FISCALIT2 DE
L'ENTREPRISE, ch. 39 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing further developments on the exemption
method and comparing with the credit method).
1994
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the income generated within its boundaries based on a territorial con-
nection with the source of the income. The Country of Residence, based
on a personal connection with the recipient, taxes its residents on their
world-wide income.
In order to alleviate the burden of double taxation, one of the
countries must renounce taxing the income. It is generally recognized
that the Country of Residence must provide relief from double taxation
and, consequently, the Country of Source has the taxing priority, a
principle that Edrey and Jeffrey call "first bite to the host country."13
Whether by internal law provisions or by treaty, relief from dou-
ble taxation occurs in one of two methods: (1) the exemption method,
or (2) the tax credit method. The latter, introduced in the United
States in 1918, consists of subtracting from the tax liability in the
Country of Residence all or part of the taxes paid abroad. The full
credit method credits all taxes paid in a foreign country against the
tax due in the Country of Residence. The ordinary credit method limits
the tax liability reduction by the amount of tax that would have been
paid in the Country of Residence. Most traditional tax credit countries,
including the United States, use this method.14
Under the exemption method, the income earned in the Country of
Source is tax free in the Country of Residence. Like the tax credit
method, the exemption method may actually provide tax relief in two
different ways: (1) full exemption, and (2) exemption with progression.
The latter does not completely disregard the income earned in the
Country of Source because the taxpayer's overall income determines
the applicable tax rate in the Country of Residence.
The following example compares both methods of exemption with
the ordinary tax credit method: Assume a taxpayer has a total income
of $200,000, one half earned in the Country of Residence and the other
half in the Country of Source. The tax rate in the Country of Residence
is 30% for an income of $100,000 and 40% for an income of $200,000.
Regardless of which tax rate the Country of Source applies, three in-
ferences may be drawn on the tax liability incurred in the Country of
Residence depending upon the method used to avoid double taxation.
First, if the Country of Residence applies the ordinary credit method,
the maximum amount of credit against the taxpayer's tax liability in
the Country of Residence equals the tax that would have been paid in
that country, 40% x $100,000 = $40,000 (example 3.1 below). If the
applicable tax rate is 50% in the Country of Source, the $50,000 tax
paid in the Country of Source cannot be used in full against the tax
liability incurred in the Country of Residence. Second, if the Country
of Residence applies the exemption with progression method, the tax-
13. Edrey & Jeffrey, supra note 12, at 104.
14. I.R.C. § 901-908 (1994).
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payer computes it's liability in the Country of Residence with the tax
rate corresponding to a $200,000 income even though only the Country
of Residence on taxes $100,000 earned in that country, 40% x $100,000
= 40,000 (parts 1.2, 2.2, and 3.2 below). Third, if the Country of Resi-
dence applies the full exemption method, the taxpayer's liability in the
Country of Residence equals 30% x $100,000 = $30,000 (parts 1.3, 2.3,
and 3.3 below). Assuming, in succession, the applicable tax rate in the
Country of Source equals 0%, 10%, and 50%, the effect on the
taxpayer's total tax liability (tax paid in the Country of Source (CS))
and tax paid in the Country of Residence(CR)) is computed as follows:
1. Country of Source tax rate equals 0%
1.1 CR applies the ordinary credit method
Tentative tax liability in CR 200,000
Less tax paid in CS
Tax liability in CR
Total tax liability ..................
x 40% = 80,000
< 0 >
80,000
......... 80,000
1.2 CR applies the exemption with progression method
CR tax liability
Plus CS tax liability
T otal tax liability ..........................
1.3 CR applies the full exemption method
CR tax liability
Plus CS tax liability
Total tax liability ..................
40,000
0
40,000
30,000
0
......... 30,000
2. CS tax rate equals 10%
2.1 CR applies the ordinary credit method
Tentative tax liability in CR 20,000 x 40% = 80,000
Less tax paid in CS <I0,000>
Tax liability in CR 70,000
Total tax liability ......... 10,000 + 70,000 = 80,000
2.2 CR applies the exemption with progression method
CR tax liability 40,000
Plus CS tax liability 10,000
Total tax liability ........................... 50,000
2.3 CR applies the full exemption method
CR tax liability 30,000
Plus CS tax liability 10,000
Total tax liability ........................... 40,000
1994
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3. CS tax rate equals 50%
3.1 CR applies the ordinary credit method
Tentative tax liablity in CR 200,000 x 40% = 80,000
Less tax paid in CS 50,000 but limited to <40,000>
Tax liability in CR 40,000
Total tax liability 50,000 + 40,000 = 90,000
3.2 CR applies the exemption with progression method
CR tax liability 40,000
Plus CS tax liability 50,000
Total tax liability ........................... 90,000
3.3 CR applies the full exemption method
CR tax liability 30,000
Plus CS tax liability 50,000
Total tax liability ........................... 80,000
As demonstrated in parts 1 and 2 of this example, the taxpayer's total
tax liability is lower if the Country of Residence applies one of the
exemption methods rather than the ordinary tax credit method. The
exemption method provides an incentive for foreign investments in
low-tax rate countries."6 These examples will be discussed in greater
15. As one observer has stated,
[tihe foreign tax credit limitation can be considered to detract from
economic efficiency, because the inability to credit excess foreign taxes
against U.S. tax on U.S. source income can result in a greater overall
tax burden for foreign than for domestic investment (where foreign taxes
VOL. 23:1
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detail below.
B. Use Of The Exemption Method In Developed Countries
Under the OECD Model Income Tax Treaty, member states have
the choice between the exemption with progression method and the
ordinary credit method. 6 Neither the full exemption method nor the
full credit method is available.
In the European Union (EU), most member-states use a combina-
tion of both methods. "[States use] the exemption method for some
types of foreign-source income such as dividends from a substantially
owned subsidiary, or branch profits, and the credit method for some
other types of foreign-source of income such as interest and royal-
ties."17
Switzerland is not a member of the EU but also uses a combina-
tion of both methods. Even absent any international convention, Swit-
zerland applies the exemption with progression method for income
earned by a resident through a foreign permanent establishment. 8
III. MECHANISM OF THE NEW U.S.-NETHERLANDS PROTOCOL AND
RELATED PROBLEMS
A. Premise
The Foreign Income Tax Rationalization and Simplification Act Of
1992,19 introduced before the Congress but never seriously considered
for passage, included a section on treaty abuse. The bill would have
amended I.R.C. §894 as follows:
paid exceed the U.S. tax). Restrictions on cross-crediting are often con-
sidered to impair competitiveness by subjecting U.S. investors to a
greater overall tax burden than their foreign competitors that benefit
from an exemption of their source income or from greater cross-crediting
opportunities.
Alan Wilensky, US Treasury Department, Treasury Report On International Tax Re-
form (1993), reprinted in 93 TAX NOTES 15-30 (Jan. 15, 1993).
16. OECD Model, art. 23A (permitting the exemption with progression method)
and 23B (permitting the ordinary credit method), supra note 4, at 364-65; ORGANIZA-
TION OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, Modhle de Convention Fiscale:
Attribution de Revenus aux Etablissements Stables, reprinted in QUESTIONS DE
FISCALITP, INTERNATIONALE NO.5, at 10 (1994) (Germany, Austria, Belgium, France,
the Netherlands, and Switzerland are some of the OECD members using the exemp-
tion method).
17. Terence L. Blackburn, The Societas Europa: The Evolving European Corpora-
tion Statute, 61 FoRDHAM L. REV. 695, 756 n. 364 (1993) (citing Commission of the
European Communities, Report of the Committee of Independent Experts on Compa-
ny Taxation 31 (1992)).
18. Art. 55 (1) AIFD (Arr~t6 du 9 d6cembre 1940 concernant limp6t fddral
direct, RS 642.1).
19. H.R. 5270, supra note 11.
1994
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(c) Limitation On Treaty Benefits.
(2) Tax Favored Income. No person shall be entitled to any benefits
granted by the United States under any treaty between the United
States and a foreign country with respect to any income of such
person if such income bears a significantly lower tax under the
laws of such foreign country than similar income arising from
sources within such foreign country derived by residents of such
foreign country.'
The proposed I.R.C. §894(c)(2) stated that notwithstanding any
treaty provision under which the U.S. had agreed to exempt U.S.
source income, such as interest, from withholding tax, the U.S. could
still impose a tax if the treaty partner (the Country of Residence),
Switzerland for example, did not tax this interest or taxed it at a sub-
stantially lower rate. In order to determine whether the rate applicable
to U.S. source interest is "significantly lower," it must be compared
with the regular Swiss rate applicable to interest from sources within
Switzerland.
Practically speaking, as long as a taxpayer of the Country of Resi-
dence earns the interest income, there is no reason the foreign source
interest income should be taxed at a lower rate than domestic source
interest income. If the Country of Residence, like Switzerland, uses the
exemption method to avoid double taxation, foreign source interest
income may be subject to a lower tax rate than domestic source foreign
income.
Hence, House Bill 5270 focuses on the triangular case and at-
tempts to eliminate this result. The technical explanation of the bill
confirms this.2 ' The explanation provides that if a corporation is a
resident of a U.S. treaty partner and has a branch in a tax haven
(hereinafter Third Country), and the Country of Residence uses the
exemption method to avoid double taxation, then any income from
sources within the U.S. earned by the branch may incur a low tax
liability or may not incur any tax liability. For example, the branch
would not have any tax liability in the U.S. because the branch is not
a separate entity and is a resident of the treaty partner and a benefi-
ciary of the income tax treaty between the U.S. and the Country of
Residence. In addition, there would be no tax liability in the Country
of Residence because this country, using the exemption method, disre-
gards foreign earnings of its residents. Finally, the Third Country may
impose a low tax rate or not impose a tax rate on the corporation. In
such a situation, H.R. 5270 would have reserved the right of the U.S.
to withhold the regular tax on such income as if there was no treaty in
place. The scope of this provision was broad. It did not relate to a spe-
20. H.R. 5270, supra note 11, § 302; I.R.C. § 894(c) (1994).
21. See STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., EXPLA-
NATION OF H.R. 5270 (Joint Comm. Print 1992).
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cific type of income from sources within the U.S., it did not recognize
an exemption if a tax had to be paid in the Third Country by the
branch, and it did not consider the possibility of an income tax treaty
between the U.S. and the Third Country.
B. The Protocol
The Protocol signed in October 1993 with the Netherlands is an
improvement over the rigid H.R. 5270. Article 24, paragraph 4 of the
Convention provided that if the Netherlands had not enacted internal
anti-tax-haven rules prior to the Convention's introduction before the
U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, then rules serving the same
goal would be added to the treaty through bilateral provisions to be
signed by both countries. In July 1993, the Netherlands Finance Min-
istry released an anti-tax-haven draft bill that was still subject to
debate in Fall 1993.22 In order to accelerate the ratification of the
treaty, negotiators from both countries signed the Protocol on October
13, 1993.
The Protocol adds two similar paragraphs to Articles 12 and 13 of
the Convention relating to interest and royalties respectively. 3 The
Protocol creates an exception to the general rule, found in Articles 12
and 13, giving exclusive competence of taxation to the Country of Resi-
dence. The Country of Source can withhold a 15% tax if the following
conditions are met: (1) Interest and royalties arising in the Country of
Source are not directly attributable to the enterprise in the Country of
Residence; (2) The interest and royalties are attributable to a perma-
nent establishment of that enterprise located in a Third Country; and
(3) The "aggregate rate of tax" imposed in both the Country of Resi-
dence and the Third Country is less than 50% of the income tax rate
applicable to an enterprise in the Country of Residence (60% for inter-
est and royalties due after January 1, 1998).
Nevertheless, no tax may be withheld for interest earned by the
permanent establishment in connection with, or incidental to, the ac-
tive conduct of a trade or business.24 Banking and insurance activities
can benefit from the active trade or business exception, even if the
income derives from related party financing or portfolio investment.
25
22. See generally John Turro, Netherlands Debates Controversial Anti-tax-haven
Rules, 93 TAX NOTES INrL 224-2 (Nov. 22, 1993) (providing more details about the
draft bill). The Netherlands Finance Ministry withdrew this controversial legislation
on December 15, 1993.
23. Convention, supra note 1, art. 12, para. 6, at 473 (relating to interest); art.
13, para. 5, at 474 (relating to royalties).
24. Convention, supra note 1, art. 12, para. 3, at 472.
25. STAFF OF U.S. TREASURY, EXPLANATION OF THE CONVENTION BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE KINGDOM OF NETHERLANDS FOR THE
AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE TAXATION AND THE PREVENTION OF FISCAL EVASION WITH
RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME SIGNED AT WASHINGTON ON DECEMBER 18, 1992, AND
1994
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Also, taxes may not be withheld for royalties received as a compensa-
tion for the use of, or the right to use, intangible property produced or
developed by the permanent establishment itself in the Third Country
(i.e. sharing the costs of development that are not undertaken in the
Third Country does not prevent withholding tax by the Country of
Source).
26
A parallel may clearly be drawn between these provisions and
general U.S. tax policy. Under I.R.C. § 871(h) and § 881(c), portfolio
interest usually is exempt from withholding tax unless the payment
occurs between related parties.27 Financing arrangements between re-
lated parties are also the target of I.R.C. § 163(j), which is an "earn-
ings stripping" provision that limits the deduction of interest paid to a
related person.'
C. Liminal Comment: The Definite Parameters
There are numerous defined parameters to the triangular case.
First, the fact that the Dutch resident corporation qualifies under the
Limitation on Benefits, stated at Article 26 of the Convention, is an
axiom in this triangular case. Second, because the United States does
not use the exemption method in order to avoid double taxation, the
provisions introduced by the Protocol, even if they seem reciprocal,
apply only to permanent establishments of Dutch corporations and not
to permanent establishments of U.S. corporations. Third, the base of
taxation of the income that may be subject to U.S. withholding tax is
the global interest and royalties from sources within the U.S. even if
the Netherlands taxes part of this income in applying a partial exemp-
tion rather than a total exemption. The example used by the Trea-
sury29 to illustrate this rule is the Netherlands-Swiss income tax
treaty under which 10% of a Dutch branch's income in Switzerland is
usually "attributed" to the Dutch corporation and included in its gross
income." In such a case, it is not only the 10% of Swiss interest and
PROTOCOL SIGNED AT WASHINGTON ON OCTOBER 13, 1993, art. 12, reprinted in 93
TAX NOTES INT'L 212-11 (Nov. 3, 1993) [hereinafter Treasury Explanation].
26. See Convention, supra note 1, art. 13 para. 3, at 473-74; Treasury Explana-
tion, supra note 25; STAFF OF THE SENATE FOREIGN COMMITTEE, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess., EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED INCOME TAX TREATY (AND PROPOSED PROTOCOL)
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS (Joint Comm.
Print 1993), [hereinafter Senate Committee Report].
27. See generally BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FUNDAMENTALS OF
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION, para. 66.2.2 (1991) (discussing "portfolio interest").
28. See generally BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXA-
TION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, para. 4.04-7 (5th ed. 1987 & Supp.
1992) (discussing "earnings stripping" rules).
29. Treasury Explanation, supra note 25, art. 12, at 212-11.
30. See Convention entre la Confederation suisse et le Royaume des Pays-Bas en
vue d'6viter les doubles impositions dans le domaine des imp6ts sur le revenu et sur
Ia fortune, Jan. 9, 1952, Switz.-Neth., art. 4, para. 6 (Swiss reference RS
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royalties income taxed in the Netherlands may be subject to the U.S:
flat 15% tax as well as the full branch interest and royalties income
from sources within the U.S. Fourth, the U.S. withholding tax has a
flat 15% rate, no matter how close the taxpayer is with its "aggregate
rate of tax" from the 50% (respectively 60% from 1998) of the "general"
Dutch tax rate.
D. The Undefined Parameters
U.S. withholding may occur if the profits of that permanent estab-
lishment are subject to an aggregate rate of tax less than 50% of the
general rate of the company tax applicable in the other State [Nether-
lands]. Three elements need to be determined: (1) the profits of the
permanent establishment; (2) the aggregate rate of tax; and (3) the
general Dutch tax rate applicable to the company.
E. The "Profits" of the Permanent Establishment
Our guideline in the present analysis is the Protocol's underlying
anti-tax haven goal. The U.S. reserved the right to tax the branch's
income if the tax rate in the Third Country is low in comparison with
the Dutch rate. A tax rate may be low for a "political" or "objective"
reason, because the jurisdiction does not want to tax a specific type of
income, no matter how important this income is, or for an "economical"
or "subjective" reason, because the taxpayer has a low taxable income.
The Protocol purpose is to tax income that is subject to an "objective"
low tax rate.
In order to gauge the tax rate, the income taken into consider-
ation cannot be lowered by deductions or losses unrelated to business
activities. If all types of income earned by the permanent establish-
ment had to be taken into account in order to meet the definition of
"business profit," as described in the U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty,
31
the determination of the applicable tax rate would be necessarily "sub-
jective" because it is influenced by the economic results of the other
activities of the permanent establishment. The term "profit" of the
permanent establishment must be understood as the profit resulting
from interest and royalties from sources within the U.S.
F. The "Aggregate Rate of Tax"
Under the Treasury Explanation, the aggregate tax rate must be
computed by adding the tax paid in the Third Country to the tax paid
in the Netherlands.32 The aggregate rate is the ratio of the taxes paid
0.672.963.61).
31. OECD Model, supra note 4, art. 7, at 188-89.
32. Treasury Explanation, supra note 25, at 212-11,
1994
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLYV
in both countries over the profits of the permanent establishment.'
The tax paid is typically a subjective criterion to gauge a tax rate
and does not serve the goal of the new U.S. policy. A literal application
of the Treasury Explanation is possible only if the branch has no extra
activities. If it does have other activities, then the Explanation must be
interpreted and "tax paid" on branch profits must be understood as
"tax payable" on the branch profits limited to U.S. interest and royal-
ties without external activity deductions.
In the Netherlands, or any country applying the exemption with
progression method,3' another question arises in determining the tax
payable on the branch's profits. The following analysis assumes the
branch has no income other than U.S. interest and royalties, but the
same question arises if the permanent establishment has other sources
of income.
As shown in the comparison between the tax exemption and tax
credit methods, if the Country of Residence applies the exemption with
progression method, the taxpayer's income in the Country of Source is
not completely disregarded because it increases the tax rate in the
Country of Residence. In example 1, had the taxpayer earned only
$100,000 entirely sourced in the Country of Residence, the applicable
tax rate would be 30%, and its tax liability would be $30,000; but,
because he also earned $100,000 in the Country of Source and has a
world-wide income of $200,000, the applicable rate is 40%, and his tax
liability equals $40,000 (example 1.2). The exemption with progression
method creates an increase in tax liability of $10,000.
In a full exemption context, the taxpayer's liability would remain
$30,000 (example 1.3). On the other hand, in a tax credit context, the
increase in tax liability would be $50,000 (tax liability in the Country
of Residence (example 1.1) less $30,000). The exemption with progres-
sion intentionally has a "side effect" on the taxpayer's liability. The
$100,000 income earned in the Country of Source is objectively tax
free, but subjectively it generated a $10,000 tax increment out of
$200,000 taxable income, corresponding to a 5% tax rate.
The Protocol does not seem to include this increase in tax liability
in the computation of the "aggregate tax rate," and the Treasury Ex-
planation is clear: The "aggregate tax rate" is the sum of the tax paid
in the third jurisdiction plus "any Netherlands tax paid by the profits"
of the permanent establishment;35 it does not say "any Netherlands
tax paid as a result of the profits." The tax paid in the Country of
Residence as a "side effect" of the exemption method with progression
33. See also Senate Committee Report, supra note 26, art. 12.
34. OECD Model, supra note 4, art. 23A, at 364-65 (stating all State Members
using the exemption method should apply the exemption with progression).
35. Treasury Explanation, supra note 25.
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must be ignored in the computation. This can be fatal to a taxpayer
who might still qualify for the U.S. withholding in some situations,
such as where the tax rate in the Country of Source is almost 50% of
the one applicable in the Country of Residence.
If the U.S. position is intransigent, its consequences must be ap-
preciated in different contexts. The "side effect" of exemption with
progression does not occur in two situations: first, if the taxpayer is
already subject to the maximum taxable rate in the Country of Resi-
dence before taking into account the income earned through the branch
in the Country of Source; second, if the taxpayer has no income in the
Country of Residence, and there is no tax base to be taxed, even at a
higher tax rate.
Finally, it is surprising that the "aggregate rate" of tax does not
seem to take into account any potential U.S. tax, even though such tax
may be imposed when the Dutch corporation is a controlled foreign
corporation (CFC).3" This question arose in a letter sent on November
10, 1993 by practitioners to the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for
Tax Policy.37
G. The "General" Dutch Rate of the Company Tax
The question arises whether the income earned by the branch has
to be taken into account in determining the applicable Dutch tax rate.
The temptation would be to deny the inclusion in order to lower the
corporation's income and, consequently, the applicable rate in the
Netherlands. However, the analysis must be consistent, and because
the Netherlands applies the exemption with progression method, the
applicable Dutch tax rate takes into account the income earned in the
Third Country.
H. Repercussions of a Tax Treaty Between the U.S. and the Third
Country
The Treasury Explanation illustrates the U.S. withholding tax
mechanism assuming that the Swiss branch of a Dutch corporation
lends funds to related parties in the U.S., and the aggregate Dutch
and Swiss rate is below the applicable threshold. The Treasury con-
cludes that "the U.S. source interest generated by those loans will be
subject to a withholding tax of 15%, instead of the exemption provided
in paragraph 1 .... "' However, Article VII of the Swiss-U.S. income
tax treaty limits the withholding tax rate to 5%, and Article VIII
36. I.R.C. §§951-964 (1994).
37. Letter from Margie Rollinson & Marie Frances Pearson to Les Samuels,
reprinted in TAX CORRESPONDENCE 3614, 3614 (Dec. 3, 1993).
38. Treasury Explanation, supra note 25, art. 12.
39. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, May 24, 1951, U.S.-Switz.,
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gives a full exemption for royalties in the Country of Source.
Under which principle could the U.S.-Netherlands Convention
influence the Swiss one? The new Dutch Convention is res inter alios
acta, and the relationship between the U.S. and its treaty partners
cannot be influenced by subsequent U.S. treaties. Furthermore, there
is no treaty override principle between U.S. treaties. Only U.S. domes-
tic legislation can override U.S. international commitments.' Finally,
the I.R.S. has ruled that in a case where two treaties would apply, the
taxpayer may choose the more favorable.4
The new Dutch Convention does not allow the United States to
disregard any prior conventions. In the aforementioned Treasury ex-
ample, if interest income from an United States source earned by a
Swiss branch qualifies for U.S. withholding under the Dutch Conven-
tion, then the withholding rate is limited to 5%. Had the Swiss branch
earned royalties, U.S. withholding would be prohibited.
It should be emphasized that this conflict between U.S. tax trea-
ties will arise quite rarely because the U.S. does not sign tax treaties
with low-tax countries. The Swiss case is peculiar because only some of
the 26 Swiss Cantons (States) have low corporation tax rates.
I. Final Comments on the Mechanism
For Dutch corporations trading with the U.S. through a branch in
a third country, the Protocol is an improvement over H.R. 5270. First,
an "aggregate tax rate" is considered - as opposed to H.R. 5270,
which only considered the Dutch rate - so Dutch corporations face
U.S. withholding tax only if their branch is a tax-haven resident. Fur-
thermore, only interest and royalties from U.S. sources are affected by
the Protocol.
The U.S. may intend to extend this new treaty policy to other
treaty partners. These countries, in negotiations with the U.S., should
take the possibility of enactment of legislation similar to H.R. 5270
into account. Such legislation would override the present treaty and
could be worse than negotiated provisions similar to the Dutch Proto-
col.
art. 7 & art. 8, 2 U.S.T. 1751, 1757.
40. See generally Harry G. Gourevitch, CRS Report Favors Treaty Override Arti-
cles in Future Conventions 93 TAX NoTEs 184-32 (Sept. 3, 1993) (analyzing the
constitutional basis for legislative overrides of tax treaties).
41. Rev. Rul. 73-354, 1973-2 C.B. 435.
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IV. POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS OF THE NEW U.S. TAX TREATY POLICY:
TREATY OVERRIDE V. BILATERAL PROVISIONS
"A treaty override occurs when an act of Congress overturns or
modifies a tax benefit granted to foreign investors by a tax treaty."'
Two different authorities share the competence of enacting internation-
al tax provisions: (1) Congress may modify the Internal Revenue Code,
and (2) the Department of the Treasury and the Senate may enter into
an international treaty. Under the interpretation of the Constitution
by the Supreme Court, when conflicts between the two different sourc-
es of law arise, the later provision in time prevails.3
Relying on this rule, Congress may be tempted to unilaterally
enact a provision in the Code that would have effects similar to the
recent Dutch Protocol, rather than enter into difficult negotiations
with U.S. treaty partners. This was actually one of the purposes of
H.R. 5270."
The advantage of a treaty override procedure, from the United
States point of view, is the efficiency and the rapidity of enactment.
For example, a new U.S.-Switzerland income tax treaty has been in
negotiation for fourteen years and is not yet enacted, but only seven
months were necessary to prepare and enact the Revenue Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1993.
This procedure, however, places the United States in a delicate
position with its treaty partners regarding its obligations under in-
ternational law. 5 In the H.R. 5270 case, the reaction was immediate.
Barely two months after the introduction of the bill before the Con-
gress, the ambassadors of eighteen OECD member countries protested
and claimed that such a provision "would be likely to lead to strong
pressures on their [our] governments to introduce retaliatory mea-
sures."
46
42. See generally Gourevitch, supra note 40 (discussing treaty overrides).
43. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATION LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §115(1)(a) (1986) states that
[ain Act of the Congress supersedes an earlier rule of international law
or a provision of an international agreement as law of the United States
if the purpose of the Act is to supersede the earlier rule or provision is
clear or if the Act and the earlier rule or provision cannot be fairly
reconciled.
44. " . . . In 1992 a bill (H.R. 5270) to reform the international tax rules was
introduced for discussion purposes. The bill, which was not brought to a vote in
either chamber, contained provisions that would have overridden tax treaties."
Gourevitch, supra note 40, at 184-32.
45. Id.
46. Letter addressed on July 20, 1992 to House Ways and Means Committee
Chairman Dan Rotenkowski, reprinted in 92 TAx NOTES 155-5 (Aug. 3, 1992).
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Today, it seems that the Treasury would rather see the U.S. nego-
tiate new treaties or protocols than enact internal law provisions to
pursue its goal of taxing income earned in triangular cases. On Octo-
ber 25, 1993, Leslie B. Samuel, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury,
referring to the new Dutch treaty, said "[tihis treaty and protocol dem-
onstrate that the treaty shopping problem can be addressed bilaterally
and that unilateral action is unnecessary." 7 This statement is partic-
ularly interesting for treaty countries, like Switzerland, that use the
exemption method and whose tax treaty with the U.S. is currently
being renegotiated.
V. CONSEQUENCES FOR U.S. TREATY PARTNERS USING THE EXEMPTION
AS A RELIEF FROM DOUBLE TAXATION AND FOR THEIR DOMESTIC
CORPORATIONS
A. For The Treaty Partners
In a triangular case such as described in the Dutch Protocol, the
United States simply retains the ability to tax specific U.S. source
income if this income is not sufficiently taxed abroad. The immediate
conclusion for the treaty partner, or Country of Residence, is that it
should tax for two reasons. First, whether the treaty partner likes it or
not, a new tax base has appeared. The only question is which country
will tax it. Altruism has no place in this field and the treaty partner
will obviously tax rather than letting this source of revenue benefit the
United States. Second, when a domestic corporation of the treaty part-
ner approaches the 50% or 60% threshold, it is more favorable to pay
the difference to the home country, rather than a flat 15% to the Unit-
ed States.
In order to limit the repercussions of the new U.S. policy on its
domestic corporation, the treaty partner should make sure that the
minimum tax required is met. The Country of Residence has two solu-
tions in order to make sure that the threshold is met. First, it could
apply a "conditional exemption" method, the condition for an exemp-
tion being a minimum aggregate tax rate corresponding to the mini-
mum required by the United States. In example 2.2 above, assuming
all income earned in the Country of Source is interest and royalties
from U.S. sources, the Country of Residence would have to tax an
extra 10,000 in order to reach the minimum tax required, and the tax-
payer will incur a total tax liability of 60,000:
47. Excerpt from remarks of the honorable Leslie B. Samuels, Assistant Secre-
tary (tax policy), U.S. Department of the Treasury, Oct. 25, 1993, to the Tax Execu-
tive Institute, Orlando, FL, reprinted in TAX NOTES IN'L, Oct. 27, 1993.
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a. Tax rate in CR for a 200,000 income
b. Minimum aggregate tax rate on the 100,000
earned in CS
c. Minimum amount of tax to be paid on branch's
income
d. Less tax paid in CS (rate 10%)
e. Extra tax to be paid in the CR
f. Total tax liability (10,000 in CS + 40,000 in CR
+ 10,000 "extra" in the CR)=
g. Aggregate tax rate on income earned in CS
(10,000 in CS + 10,000 in CR)/100,000=
40%
20%
20,000
<10,000>
10,000
60,000
20%
The second solution for the Country of Residence is to give up, at
least partially, its exemption method and to adopt a "limited tax cred-
it" method. The method would limit the credit to the U.S. source inter-
est and royalties income earned by the branch. The coexistence of both
tax credit and exemption methods is not unusual in itself. It is neces-
sary, in fact, for countries that use the exemption method and sign an
income tax treaty including an exemption of interest and royalties in
the Country of Source." Without a tax credit method limited to such
types of income, interest and royalties would be tax free in both the
Country of Source, because of the treaty, and the Country of Resi-
dence, because of its exemption method. In this case, the tax credit is
an alternative method of relief from double taxation when the taxpayer
in the Country of Residence directly earns the interest and royalties
from the Country of Source. In the triangular case, the U.S. policy
imposes on its treaty partner a switch from one method to another
when the taxpayer earns these types of income through a branch in a
third jurisdiction.
By applying a "limited tax credit" method, as in example 2.2, the
Country of Residence would tax the total income earned by the branch
at a regular tax rate because we assumed it would be entirely U.S.
source interest and royalties. The taxpayer would incur a total tax lia-
bility of 80,000:
a. Taxable income in CR
b. Tentative tax liability in CR (40% tax rate)
c. Less tax paid in CS
d. Total liability in CR
e. Total tax liability is 10,000 in CS + 70,000 in
CR=
f. Aggregate tax rate on income earned in CS
200,000
80,000
<10,000>
70,000
80,000
40%
48. OECD Model, supra note 4, art. 23A para. 2, at 346-65; see generally RMER,
supra note 12, chapter 41.6 (describing the Swiss tax credit method as applied to
interest and royalties).
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For the domestic corporation, the "limited tax credit" method is
worse because it generates taxation of U.S. source interest and roy-
alties at the full corporate tax rate in the Country of Residence. On the
other hand, the "conditional exemption" method in all cases limits the
taxation of the U.S. interest and royalties to the rate necessary to
avoid U.S. withholding.
The comparison of the tax burden on the branch's income can be
drawn whether the treaty partner adopts one of the above mentioned
methods or does nothing. A tax burden of 25,000, or 25%, is due on the
branch's income if the treaty country does not tax (10,000 paid in the
Country of Residence and 15,000 withheld in the United States). A
20% tax burden is due under the "conditional exemption" method, and
40% is due under the limited tax credit method. Consequently, if the
source country is a "no-tax" country, the U.S. 15% withholding tax is
always preferable for the corporation if the tax rate applicable in its
home country is higher than 30%.
What happens if the treaty partner is bound by a tax treaty with
the Third Country? No definite answer may be given because it de-
pends upon the relevant provision of the treaty, concerning treaty
renegotiation. Usually, without a treaty overriding practice in the
Country of Residence, the treaty must be renegotiated.
B. For Their Domestic Corporations
In the following analysis, we will assume that U.S. source interest
and royalties qualify for U.S. withholding under provisions similar to
the present Dutch Protocol. We will then consider the effect of this
framework on a corporation resident of the U.S. treaty partner in two
financial situations. In the first scenario, the corporation has no tax-
able income in the Country of Residence.49 In the second scenario, the
corporation is in the highest tax bracket in its Country of Residence.
In both situations, we will consider whether the corporation should let
the U.S. interest and royalties be earned by the branch in the Third
Country, repatriate this type of income in the Country of Residence, or
even transfer it to a Fourth Country. The answer depends upon the
tax policy adopted in the Country of Residence after having signed a
treaty or a protocol including a triangular case provision with the
49. This does not mean, for the purpose of the triangular case mechanism, that
the applicable corporation tax rate equals zero. In fact, the applicable tax rate is de-
termined not only by the income earned in the Country of Residence but also by the
income earned in the Third Country, whether the Country of Residence applies the
exemption method or the tax credit method.
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United States.
1. The Country of Residence Keeps the Exemption Method with
Progression as a Relief from Double Taxation
If the corporation has no taxable income in the Country of Resi-
dence, it has no tax liability even though the applicable tax rate is
more than zero because of the income earned in the Third Country. In
this case, the corporation should keep this source of income in the
Third Country as long as the sum of the tax rate applicable in this
country plus the 15% U.S. withholding is below the applicable tax rate
in the Country of Residence; the same applies if the corporation is in
the highest tax bracket in its home country.
If the aggregate U.S. and Third Country tax rate exceeds the
applicable tax rate in the Country of Residence, then the corporation
should consider repatriation to the Country of Residence. Repatriation
must be examined carefully because it may have strong repercussions
on the tax status of the corporation. Depending on the internal law of
the Country of Residence, the corporation may lose a privileged "pure
holding corporation" tax treatment because, for example, it would earn
another type of income than just dividends. The corporation should
also consider transferring the U.S. source income of the branch to a
Fourth Country that has an income tax treaty with the U.S. limiting
or suppressing the U.S. withholding tax rate.
2. The Country Of Residence Adopts the "Conditional Exemption"
Method
This method guarantees to the corporation that its branch's U.S.
income will not be taxed at a rate higher than one-half of the applica-
ble tax rate in the Country of Residence. Whether the corporation has
any taxable income in the County of Residence or is in the highest tax
bracket, it is always advantageous to keep this income in the Third
Country. Again, the corporation should consider tranferring the income
to a Fourth Country that has a tax treaty with the U.S.
3. The Country of Residence Adopts the "Limited Tax Credit"
Method
The Limited Tax Credit Method suppresses the U.S. 15% with-
holding tax and taxes the U.S. interest and royalties at the full appli-
cable rate in the Country of Residence. This solution is clearly the
worst for the corporation unless the applicable tax rate in the Country
of Residence is less than 15%. This might happen if the corporation
has no taxable income in the Country of Residence before the inclusion
of the branch's income and if this income is not too high according to
the scale applicable in the home country.
Because this method is based on the tax credit method, there is no
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reason to move the U.S. source income from one country to another.
Wherever such income is earned, it will be taxed in the Country of
Residence unless it can be stripped out.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Triangular Case is a major new concern of the United States
international tax policy. After an attempt in 1992 to introduce some
internal law provisions unilaterally denying the benefit of tax treaties
in such triangular cases, and disregarding the fact that the U.S. source
income may be taxed in the Third Country, the United States negotiat-
ed a less extreme provision in the Dutch treaty.
There is no doubt that this policy will be expanded, either through
a treaty-overriding provision in the Internal Revenue Code or through
new treaties. Among all U.S. treaty partners, the next country that
will have to negotiate a triangular case provision is certainly Switzer-
land. A new tax treaty between the United States and Switzerland is
now being negotiated, and Switzerland, like the Netherlands, applies
the exemption method as a relief from double taxation.
In a November 9, 1993 letter sent to the U.S. Treasury's interna-
tional tax counsel,' the Swiss-American Chamber of Commerce em-
phasized the importance of the business relationship between the two
countries. Switzerland is the fourth largest recipient of U.S. direct
investments abroad and ranks seventh among foreign direct investors
in the United States. The Chamber of Commerce further emphasized
the important tax matters that must be negotiated. In particular, re-
ferring to anti-treaty-shopping provisions, the Chamber of Commerce
wrote the following:
We believe for treaty abuse provisions to effectively work in an in-
creasingly complex business environment, it would be quite inap-
propriate if not presumptuous to seek to catch all situations which,
from a purely formal viewpoint, may have a vague connotation of
treaty abuse. Effective anti-abuse provisions must be simple and
deal with the obvious.
The Triangular Case is not exactly a treaty shopping structure,
but, from the point of view of the United States, it is nevertheless an
abusive use of a treaty. Does it therefore deserve a special treatment
as prescribed in the Dutch Protocol, or rather should the Triangular
Case be ignored as having only "a vague connotation of treaty abuse"?
We will let the negotiators answer this political question and content
ourselves with tax planning recommendations to the foreign corpora-
50. Letter from Swiss-American Chamber of Commerce to Cynthia G. Beerbower
(Nov. 9, 1993), reprinted in 93 TAX NOTES INTL 228-10 (Nov. 29, 1993).
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tions using a triangular structure for their U.S. interest and royalties
income.

